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EXPORTING COMPONENTS OF PATENTED PRODUCTS:
A UNIQUE WAY TO INFRINGE
Michael A. Sanzo*
For the most part, United States patent law is only concerned
with activities that take place in the United States and its
territories. One of the rare exceptions to this may be found in 35
U.S.C. § 271(f). The first part of this statute makes it an act of
infringement for a party in the United States to supply a foreign
entity with components of a patented invention when the
components are uncombined as sent but are supplied in a manner
that induces their being combined abroad to form a product
covered by the patent.1 Remarkably, liability may occur even
though an infringing product has never been made, used, or sold in
the United States and without the patent owner having experienced
any demonstrable harm.2
This article argues that the most recent interpretation of this
statute by the Federal Circuit is so vague and expansive that it will
be almost impossible for manufacturers operating in the United
States to assess and avert the risk of patent infringement
associated with the sale of components to foreign entities. The
consequent incentive is for the manufacturer to either forgo the
sale or to relocate manufacturing facilities outside the United
States. Thus, § 271(f), which was enacted based in part on the idea
that it would improve the United States trade balance and
encourage the development of United States jobs, actually does the
opposite. At a minimum, the language used in the statute should be

* Mike Sanzo is a patent attorney working in the areas of chemistry,
biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. Dr. Sanzo can be reached at
mike@msanzolaw.com.
1
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2012).
2
James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws:
Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1215, 1216–17 (2006).
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clarified by the Supreme Court, and ideally, the statute should be
repealed entirely.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Activities occurring in other countries generally have no effect
with respect to the infringement of a United States patent.3 There
is, however, an exception. Under certain circumstances, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) allows the owner of a patented invention to sue a person
or entity that has merely supplied components of the invention to a
foreign entity.4 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) reads as follows:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial
portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such
components outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
3

Id.; see also Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Divided Infringement: Expanding
the Extraterritorial Scope of Patent Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281 (2007)
(arguing that U.S. patent law needs to become more extraterritorial).
4
Farrand, supra note 2; Wasserman, supra note 3.
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(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of a
patented invention that is especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in
whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made
or adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.5
Remarkably, § 271(f) may be invoked even though the act of
providing individual components of a combination invention is
not, in itself, infringing, and even though the party receiving the
components in a foreign country does not itself engage in any
infringing activities. Thus, unlike other sections of United States
law dealing with inducing infringement6 or contributory
infringement,7 there is no requirement in § 271(f) that there have
been any direct infringement of a United States patent, i.e., there
need not have been the making, use, or sale of an invention in the
United States or its territories.8
Several of the most important requirements that are needed for
a patent holder to invoke § 271(f) are those that are italicized in the
statute as shown above. Under paragraph two, at least one
component transferred must be “especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use.”9 This provides a simple, straightforward test that can be used
by manufacturers exporting goods to comfortably conclude that
their activities will not infringe this section of the statute.
5

35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012) (emphasis added) (The statute was signed into law
as part of the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984.).
6
§ 271(b).
7
Id.
8
For a review on inducing patent infringement, see Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1008 (2016).
9
§ 271(f).
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Unfortunately, the law is much more complicated with respect
to paragraph one. The most important limitations in this section
with respect to assessing whether a transfer creates an infringement
risk will typically be that (a) all, or a substantial portion of, the
components of the patented invention must have been provided to
a foreign party; and (b) this must have been done in a manner that
induces the subsequent combining of components in an
“infringing” manner.10 In December of 2014, the Federal Circuit
decided Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp.,11 and defined
these restrictions in such broad and vague terms as to raise the
question of whether these restrictions significantly limit the statute
at all. Under this decision, a United States manufacturer will
generally find it almost impossible to determine if the transfer of
components to foreign entities is within the scope of § 271(f)(1).
Clarity may improve however. In response to a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari filed in June of 2015,12 the Supreme Court
invited the Solicitor General to file a Brief expressing the views of
the United States.13 This Brief was filed on May 11, 201614 and, on
June 27, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the Petition.15 It is
possible that, in its decision, the Supreme Court will redefine at
10

More specifically, the invention would be a direct infringement if made in
the United States.
11
773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
12
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.,
2015 WL 3941490 (June 26, 2015) (No. 14-1538), www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/life-technologies-corporation-v-promega-corporation/.
13
Supreme Court of the United States, Order List: 577 U.S.: Orders in
Pending
Cases
(Oct.
5,
2015),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/100515zor_4f15.pdf (noting
the order for No: 14-1538 inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief for the
United States).
14
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 23, Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp., 2016 WL 2765361
(May 11, 2016) (No. 14-1538), www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lifetechnologies-corporation-v-promega-corporation/.
15
See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). The Court
has limited its review to the question of whether supplying a single, commodity
component of a multi-component invention is an infringing act under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f)(1) (2012). It will not address the question of whether a single entity can
“actively induce” itself to infringe.
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least some of the terms used in § 271(f) in a clearer and more
restrictive way.
This article argues that, apart from some limited instances in
which Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions have provided
clear guidelines,16 United States manufacturers must currently
assume that the transfer of components to foreign entities for
assembly and sale abroad carries with it a substantial risk of patent
infringement. The article also suggests that § 271(f), and
particularly its first paragraph, unfairly rewards United States
patent holders at the expense of United States manufacturers. At a
time when manufacturing in the United States is near an all time
low, and the United States trade imbalance is near an all time high,
this statute provides a clear incentive for companies to move their
manufacturing operations outside the country. Until a more
reasonable statutory construction is arrived at or, more
optimistically, the statute is eliminated entirely, companies need to
be aware of the risk it presents with respect to exportation of
goods.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) was enacted in response to the 1972
Supreme Court decision, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.17 This case involved an appeal by Deepsouth of a lower
court injunction barring it from distributing or using machinery for
the deveining of shrimp because this would infringe patent claims
owned by Laitram.18 The claims were directed at a “slitter” (which
was designed to mechanically generate slices in deshelled shrimp
in a way that exposed the sandy “veins” running along their backs)
and at a “tumbler” (which was used after the slitter to mechanically
16

Regarding the transfer of tangible subject matter and the use of the actual
materials sent in an infringing product abroad, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp, 127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007). Regarding the infringement of method claims, see
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 315 Fed. 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
17
406 U.S. 518 (1972).
18
Id. at 519.
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remove veins).19 Both the slitter and tumbler were “combination
inventions,” i.e., they were made up of components that were
known in the art but which were combined in a new and
nonobvious way.20
There was no dispute that the injunction that Deepsouth had
received prevented it from making, using, or selling slitters or
tumblers within the scope of Laitram’s claims in the United
States.21 However, Deepsouth argued that, since the individual
components of the devices were not covered by the claims and
since the patents only applied to activities occurring in the United
States, it should not be liable for past sales of components to
foreign entities and the injunction should be modified to recognize
its right to continue these sales in the future.22
Although the district court agreed with Deepsouth’s
argument,23 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.24
The appellate court argued that to “make” an invention in the
context of the patent statute means “the substantial manufacture of
the constituent parts of the machine.”25 It stated:
The Constitutional mandate [to accord patent protection]
cannot be limited to just manufacturing and selling within
the United States. The infringer would then be allowed to
reap the fruits of the American economy—technology,
labor, materials, etc.—but would not be subject to the
responsibilities of the American patent laws. We cannot
permit an infringer to enjoy these benefits and then be
19

Id. at 520.
Id. at 520–21.
21
Id. at 522.
22
Id. at 520–24. Although the components were not combined in the United
States, there was no doubt that Deepsouth recognized that they would be
combined to form a shrimp deveining machine once delivered. The components
were shipped to foreign customers in three separate boxes which could be
assembled to form a complete machine in less than an hour.
23
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 310 F. Supp. 926, 929 (E. D. LA
1970), rev’d, 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971), rev’d and remanded, 406 U.S. 518
(1972).
24
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971),
rev’d and remanded, 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
25
Id. at 938–39.
20
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allowed to strip away a portion of the patentee’s
protection.26
The Supreme Court granted a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
and, on May 30, 1972, completely rejected the holdings of the
lower court:
The Court of Appeals, believing that the word “makes”
should be accorded “a construction in keeping with the
ordinary meaning of that term,” held against Deepsouth on
the theory that “makes” “means what it ordinarily
connotes—the substantial manufacture of the constituent
parts of the machine.” . . . [W]e find the Fifth Circuit’s
definition unacceptable because it collides head on with a
line of decisions so firmly embedded in our patent law as to
be unassailable absent a congressional recasting of the
statute.27
The Court emphasized that, in order for there to be an
inducement to infringe, direct infringement must have occurred.28
This requires the making, use, or sale of a patented invention in the
United States or its territories. Since an invention that is a
combination of components does not exist unless all of the
components are assembled, the sale of uncombined components
cannot constitute an infringement.29 The Court concluded that:
[W]e note that what is at stake here is the right of American
companies to compete with an American patent holder in foreign
markets. Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial
effect; “these acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to,
operate beyond the limits of the United States. . . .” To the degree
that the inventor needs protection in markets other than those of
this country, the wording of 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 and 271 reveals a
congressional intent to have him seek it abroad through patents
26

Id. (citations omitted). Although this decision was written prior to the
enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012), the court, remarkably, seems to believe
that United States patents accord their owners rights with respect to foreign
markets.
27
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 528 (citations omitted).
28
Id. at 526.
29
Id. at 526–31.
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secured in countries where his goods are being used. Respondent
holds foreign patents; it does not adequately explain why it does
not avail itself of them.30
It is worth noting that the Court recognized that it is not just the
rights of United States patent holders that were at stake, but also
the right of other United States companies to compete in foreign
commerce.31 This recognition was sorely lacking in the subsequent
legislative effort that resulted in the adoption of section § 271(f).32
B. Enactment of Legislation33
Although twelve years passed from the time that Deepsouth
was decided until the adoption of § 271(f), the legislative history of
the statute leaves no doubt that it was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court’s decision.34 At the time that the relevant
legislation was introduced, Robert Kastenmeier, the sponsor in the
House of Representatives, stated:
The second part of this bill [the part concerned with 271(f)]
provides greater protection for U.S. patent holders when copiers
produce all of the parts of a patented product in the country but
who move offshore for final assembly before export. This proposal
responds to a suggestion made by the Supreme Court in Deepsouth

30

Id. at 531 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856)) (citations
omitted).
31
Id.
32
There were, however, four justices who dissented and agreed with the Court
of Appeals that the invention in this case should be considered to have been
made in the United States by Deepsouth. These judges seem to take the view
that the patent statute is infringed when an invention is essentially or
substantially made in the United States. See id. at 532–34.
33
To find a summary of the progression of the legislation, see William R.
Thornewell II, Patent Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of
Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to Software and “Virtual
Components”, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815, 2816–19 (2005).
34
The proposal to add section (f) to 35 U.S.C. § 271, was included as part of
the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984. See S 1535, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(June 23 , 1983)); 129 CONG. REC. S9005-06 (June 23, 1983); H.R. 4526, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 18, 1983).
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Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) for a
legislative solution to this issue.35
A committee report characterized the corresponding Senate
Bill as follows:
The bill simply amends the patent law so that when
components are supplied for assembly abroad to
circumvent a patent, the situation will be treated the same
as when the invention is “made” or “sold” in the United
States. (Patent infringement currently is defined as making,
using, or selling an invention in the United States.)
The bill is needed to help maintain a climate in the
United States conducive to invention, innovation, and
investment. Permitting the subterfuge which is allowed
under the Deepsouth interpretation of the patent law
weakens confidence in patents among businesses and
investors.36
Later, the same report says:
Subsection (b)(3) of Section 2 will prevent copiers from
avoiding U.S. patents by shipping overseas the components
of a product patented in this country so that the assembly of
the components will be completed abroad. This proposal
responds to a comment by the United States Supreme Court
in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518
(1972), calling for a legislative solution to close a loophole
in patent law. 37
The arguments quoted above, and many others made during the
enactment of § 271(f), seem exaggerated. Although the Supreme
Court did indicate that it would not expand the reach of patent law
to include activities occurring outside the United States in the
absence of a clear and certain signal from Congress,38 there is
35

129 CONG. REC. E5777-79, at E5778 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983),
https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/files/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/129%
20Cong.%20Rec.%20E577779%20%28daily%20ed.%20Nov.%2018,%201983%29.pdf.
36
S. REP. NO. 98-663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (Oct. 5, 1984).
37
Id. at 6.
38
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
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nothing to justify the suggestion that the Court was “calling for a
legislative solution” to close a “loophole” in the law.39 The
characterization of Deepsouth as having engaged in a “subterfuge”
and the Supreme Court’s decision as having been based on a defect
in the law characterizes the comments of almost every organization
and individual that weighed in on the legislation during
congressional hearings. For example, Donald Banner, speaking
behalf of Intellectual Property Owners, Inc., stated:
The existing patent law on this point is unfair. It permits a
subterfuge. The law should not permit substantially all the
manufacturing activity to take place in the United States and yet
allow the patent to be avoided by a technicality.40
Similarly, speaking for the American Intellectual Property Law
Association, Bernarr Pravel suggested:
We believe that a patentee, such as Laitram, should
have the right to benefit from his invention. The holding in
the Deepsouth Case enables domestic copiers to circumvent
the protection afforded by the patent laws by taking simple
evasive production and marketing tactics. This loophole in
the law negatively affects the patentees’ ability to export
his invention or license others to do so. Defeating the
expectation of innovative companies of benefitting from
export trade is a severe disincentive, serious injustice, and
is especially contrary to current economic policies designed
to reduce United States trade deficits.41
Others supporting§ 271(f) included the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”),42 Chemical Manufacturers
39

See id. at 531.
Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 46 (1984) (statement of Donald W. Banner, Intellectual
Property Owners, Inc.).
41
Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 61 (1984) (statement of Bernarr R. Pravel, American
Intellectual Property Law Association).
42
Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the
40
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Association, and National Association of Manufacturers43 and
private companies such as Monsanto and Procter & Gamble.44 The
only person or entity who seems to have expressed a substantial
concern about the wisdom of the legislation was Peter Maggs, a
professor of law at the University of Illinois:
A closer look should be taken at the attempt to reverse the
Deepsouth decision. It seems quite possible that if this
legislation is enacted, copiers will merely shift production
operations overseas, beyond the reach of the U.S. patent
system. This would mean a loss of jobs in the United
States, with no real gain for holders of United States
patents. Indeed, along these economic lines an argument
could be made for legislation providing that manufacture of
goods for export in general does not constitute an
infringement of a U.S. patent.45
Apart from the brief objection noted above, no person or entity
seems to have considered the possibility that a “legislative
solution” might not be needed, or that trying to impose one might
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 19 (1984) (statement of Hon. Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks and Rene D.
Tegtmeyer, Assistant Commissioner for Patents, Patent and Trademark Office).
43
Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 169 (1984) (statement of Richard C. Witte, Chemical
Manufacturers Association, and National Association of Manufacturers).
44
Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S. 1841 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 151 (1984) (statement of John E. Maurer, General
Consulting Attorney, Monsato Company); see also Ronald W. Reagan,
Statement on Signing the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, REAGAN
LIBRARY
(Nov.
9,
1984),
https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1984/110984e.htm
(“[The legislation] also closes a loophole in existing law which permitted
copiers to export jobs and avoid liability by arranging for final assembly of
patented machines to occur offshore.”).
45
Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3285, H.R. 3286, and
H.R. 3605 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of
Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 1735 (1984) (comments on S.
1535 submitted by Peter B. Maggs, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Ill. at UrbanaChampaign).
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not be a good idea. The sending of parts abroad by Deepsouth did
not deprive Laitram of any profits in the United States or prevent
Laitram from selling its machinery in other countries. What
commentators characterized as a “loophole”46 might equally have
been characterized as a well-established, bright-line principle that
one cannot infringe a patent unless one actually, not
approximately, makes or does something covered by the claims.
Similarly, what commentators referred to as a “technicality”47 is
based on the principle that patent law cannot legitimately extend
beyond a country’s own borders, an idea rooted in international
comity.48 Finally, the fact that Deepsouth did not assemble the
components of Laitram’s machine prior to sending them to foreign
countries could just as easily be described as an attempt to avoid
infringing Laitram’s United States patents as an attempt at
subterfuge.
During the enactment of § 271(f), there were suggestions that
patent law as expressed in Deepsouth damaged the trade balance of
the United States and led to a loss of United States jobs.49 In fact,
the opposite appears more likely. After the Supreme Court
decision, but before the enactment of § 271(f), Deepsouth could
continue to employ people to manufacture the components that
were being shipped overseas.50 After the enactment of § 271(f), this
was no longer possible, and there is no reason to assume that
46

See, e.g., Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S.
1841, supra note 44.
47
See, e.g., Patent Law Improvements Act: Hearing on S. 1535 and S.
1841, supra note 43.
48
For a discussion of comity in the context of patent law, see Farrand, supra
note 2, at 1220–25.
49
See, Thornewell, Patent Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of
Technology: Application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to Software and "Virtual
Components," 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815, 2835-2836 (2005); see also S. REP.
NO. 98-663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (Oct. 5, 1984). Evidently those making
such allegations thought that their validity was self-evident and provided no
actual support for these ideas. See id.
50
Compare Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526
(1972) (indicating that, in the absence of an intent by Deepsouth that its
production and sales activity would lead to the use of deveiners in the US, there
can be no infringement), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012) (suggesting the
opposite).
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customers would then be forced to buy machines or components
from Laitram. Instead, customers might find a foreign supplier or,
if profits warranted it, Deepsouth itself might move its
manufacturing operation overseas. In either case, the effect of
§ 271(f) is to foster a loss of United States jobs and trade.
C. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.51
In 2001, AT&T filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, alleging that Microsoft had
infringed AT&T’s claims to an apparatus for recording speech.52
The undisputed facts were that Microsoft’s Windows program
included code which, after installation, allowed computers to
compress and encode speech in a manner similar to the apparatus
claimed by AT&T.53 Microsoft transferred this software from the
United States to foreign manufacturers on a master disk or by
electronic transmission, and the software was then copied and
installed on computers sold abroad.54 Although the software, prior
to installation, clearly did not infringe any patent claims, AT&T
alleged that it was a component of its claimed invention which,
when combined with a computer overseas, constituted an
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).55
Microsoft denied any liability based primarily on two
arguments: (1) software is intangible information and, as such,
cannot be characterized as a “component” of an invention as this
term is used in § 271(f); and (2) the software code installed on the
foreign computers was not “supplied” from the United States but
rather generated abroad.56 The District Court did not accept these
arguments and held in favor of AT&T.57 The decision was affirmed
on appeal to the Federal Circuit and then taken up for review by
the Supreme Court.58
51

127 S.Ct. 1746 (2007).
U.S. Patent No. RE32,580 (filed Sept. 18, 1986).
53
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1750.
54
Id. at 1751, 1753.
55
Id. at 1753.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.

52
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With Justice Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court rulings and accepted both
arguments made by Microsoft.59 The Court held that section 271(f)
only applies to components that are amenable to being combined to
form a patented invention.60 Software is not combinable unless it is
part of an activating medium, and therefore software code, as an
idea without physical embodiment, is not a component within the
meaning of the statute.61 Thus, Microsoft could not be liable for
infringement solely because the code that it had supplied was
loaded on computers.62
The second issue addressed by the Court was whether the
§ 271(f) requirement, that an infringer must have “supplied”
components of an invention, means that the same components sent
must also be the ones in the final invention or, if instead, copies of
the components sent will suffice.63 Here, the Supreme Court took
the view that § 271(f) only applies to situations in which the
components sent and the components used in the invention
assembled abroad are identical.64 It held that:
Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “from
the United States . . . in such manner as to actively induce
the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1)
(emphasis added). Under this formulation, the very
components supplied from the United States, and not
copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined
abroad to form the patented invention at issue. Here, as we
59

Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1753.
Id. at 1755.
61
Id.
62
This view may have important consequences in the area of biotechnology.
Genes are essentially abstract code expressed in the form of nucleotides
arranged on a double stranded biopolymer. Genes reproduced and transferred
from one organism to another would not appear to be supplied components
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012).
63
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1756–57; see also AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,
414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 437 (2007), and order
recalled and vacated, 227 Fed. Appx. 920 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (asserting that, “for
software ‘components,’” the act of copying is subsumed in the act of
“supplying”).
64
Microsoft, 127 S.Ct. at 1757.
60
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have repeatedly noted, the copies of Windows actually
installed on the foreign computers were not themselves
supplied from the United States. Indeed, those copies did
not exist until they were generated by third parties outside
the United States . . . . The absence of anything addressing
copying in the statutory text weighs against a judicial
determination that replication abroad of a master
dispatched from the United States “supplies” the foreignmade copies from the United States within the intendment
of § 271(f).65
In the last portion of the opinion, the Court emphasized that,
despite the passage of § 271(f) by Congress, there is a strong
presumption against extraterritoriality that should act as a restraint
against expansive interpretations of this section of the law66 and
rejected the view that the ease with which infringement can be
avoided should be a substantial factor in deciding how to interpret
§ 271(f)(1).67
On a technical level, Microsoft establishes that the components
referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) are limited to tangible subject
matter and that the actual material sent from the United States must
itself be combined with other elements to establish an infringing
invention.68 More generally, it indicates that the Supreme Court is
very cognizant of the potential issues of extraterritoriality posed by
this statute and that they are likely to be reluctant to construe its
terms expansively in the future.69
D. Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude Medical70
This case has a complicated litigation history, which, for the
most part, is of no importance to the present discussion. Of
relevance is that Cardiac Pacemakers sued St. Jude for infringing
patent claims to methods of using implantable cardioverter
65

Id.
Id. at 1758–59.
67
Id. at 1760.
68
Id. at 1755.
69
Id. at 1759–60.
70
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
66
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defibrillators (“ICDs”) in the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana.71 The court held that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)
applies to method claims and that St. Jude’s shipment of ICDs
abroad could result in a violation of that section of the statute.72 St.
Jude appealed this holding, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision. St. Jude then filed a petition for rehearing
en banc, which was granted.73
The en banc court overruled both the district court and its own
previous decision and held that method claims are not covered by
§ 271(f).74 One reason for this is that, like the abstract information
discussed in Microsoft, individual steps in a process claim are not
tangible components capable of being transferred in the sense of
the statute.75 Thus, the court stated:
In interpreting the terms of Section 271(f), it is critical to
recall what a “patented invention” consists of when method
patents are at issue. We have noted “the distinction between
a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which are
tangible items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a
series of acts or steps.” Thus, a component of a tangible
product, device, or apparatus is a tangible part of the
product, device, or apparatus, whereas a component of a
method or process is a step in that method or process. As
we demonstrate herein, this fundamental distinction
between claims to a product, device, or apparatus on one
hand and claims to a process or method on the other, is
critical to the meaning of the statute and dooms Cardiac’s
argument on this issue.76

71

Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1359. The district court relied on a previous Federal Circuit decision,
Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366
(2005), in holding that method claims could be infringed under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f) (2012). Id.
73
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 315 Fed. Appx. 273 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
74
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 576 F.3d at 1362.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1362 (citations omitted).
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Importantly, the court draws a distinction between the tangible
compositions or devices that may be used in performing the steps
of a method and the steps themselves:
Cardiac disagrees that a component of a patented method is
a step of that method. Instead, Cardiac urges us to adopt a
definition of “component” that would encompass “the
apparatus that performed the process.” That position is
clearly contrary to the text of Section 271(f). It is not even
supported by the lone amicus brief we have received in
favor of including method patents within Section 271(f)’s
reach.77
Thus, it is the steps that are the components referred to in
§ 271(f) and not the tangible materials used in performing the
steps. In order to infringe under § 271(f), a United States company
would have to supply a foreign party with a method step, and this
is not possible under the way in which the term “supply” has been
construed:
Although such patented methods do have components, as
indicated, Section 271(f) further requires that those
components be “supplied.” That requirement eliminates
method patents from Section 271(f)’s reach. The ordinary
meaning of “supply” is to “provide that which is required,”
or “to furnish with . . . supplies, provisions, or equipment.”
These meanings imply the transfer of a physical object.
Supplying an intangible step is thus a physical
impossibility, a position that not even Cardiac seems to
dispute . . . . As we have noted before, “it is difficult to
conceive how one might supply or cause to be supplied all
or a substantial portion of the steps in a patented method in
the sense contemplated by” Section 271(f).78
III.
PROMEGA CORP. V. LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP.79
Short tandem repeats (STRs) are sequence elements that are
repeated multiple times at specific sites in the human genome.80
77

Id. at 1363 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1364.
79
773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
78
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The number of repeats at any given locus varies from one
individual to the next, and by analyzing multiple sites, a profile
may be obtained that allows an individual to be identified.81 One
difficulty with STR profiling is that, in order for it to be efficiently
performed, PCR amplification at multiple sites must be
simultaneously carried out and, historically, it has been difficult to
find PCR primers that can be used together without adversely
affecting one another’s effectiveness.82
Promega owned (or had) an exclusive license to several patents
that covered kits for STR profiling. In 2010, it brought suit before
a jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin alleging that Life Technologies had infringed upon
these patents.83 One of the allegations made was that Life
Technologies had violated § 271(f)(1) by shipping Taq polymerase
from the United States to a Life Technologies facility in the United
Kingdom where it was sold as part of STR profiling kits.84 In
addition to the polymerase, the kits included a primer mix; a PCR
reaction mix; a buffer solution; and control DNA.85 The jury found
in favor of Promega on this issue and awarded damages based on
the sales that had occurred overseas.86 This finding was vacated in
a JMOL by the district court, and Promega appealed to the Federal
Circuit.87
A. Requirement for “All or a Substantial Portion of the
Components”
After ruling on issues concerning the validity of Promega’s
claims,88 the Federal Circuit addressed the two primary findings on
80

Id. at 1342.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1343–44.
84
Id. at 1345.
85
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
During appeal, the Federal Circuit found most of the claims that Promega
tried to enforce to be invalid due to their failure to meet the enablement
81
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which the lower court had based its JMOL.89 The first of these
concerned the requirement of § 271(f)(1) that an infringer must
have supplied “all or a substantial portion of the components of a
patented invention.”90 By comparing the language of § 271(b)91 and
§ 271(f) and carrying out a textual analysis, the district court
reached the conclusion that infringement under § 271(f) could not
be the result of supplying only a single component of
multicomponent invention.92 Since Life Technologies had only
supplied Taq polymerase to a kit that had a total of five
components, the court concluded that no infringement had
occurred.93
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed based on the following
reasoning:
The dictionary definition of “substantial” is “important” or
“essential.” A “portion” is defined as a “section or quantity
within a larger thing; a part of a whole.” Nothing in the
ordinary meaning of “portion” suggests that it necessarily
requires a certain quantity or that a single component
requirement of patentability. However, one claim survived and provided a basis
for Promega’s assertions under § 271(f). This read as follows:
42. A kit for analyzing polymorphism in at least one locus in a DNA
sample, comprising: a) at least one vessel containing a mixture of
primers constituting between 1 and 50 of said primer pairs; b) a vessel
containing a polymerizing enzyme suitable for performing a primerdirected polymerase chain reaction; c) a vessel containing the
deoxynucleotide tri-phosphates adenosine, guanine, cytosine and
thymidine; d) a vessel containing a buffer solution for performing a
polymerase chain reaction; e) a vessel containing a template DNA
comprising i) a simple or cryptically simple nucleotide sequence having
a repeat motif length of 3 to 10 nucleotides and ii) nucleotide sequences
flanking said simple or cryptically simple nucleotide sequence that are
effective for annealing at least one pair of said primers, for assaying
positive performance of the method.
U.S. Patent No. RE37,984, col. 16 (filed Feb. 11, 2003).
89
Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., No. 10-cv-281-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82708, at *10-15 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2010).
90
Id. at *10–13.
91
Section 271(b) is also concerned with inducing infringement, but requires
there to have been direct infringement in the United States.
92
Life Techs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82708, at *10-15.
93
Id. at *15.
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cannot be a “portion” of a multi-component invention.
Rather, the ordinary meaning of “substantial portion”
suggests that a single important or essential component can
be a “substantial portion of the components” of a patented
invention . . . .94
Taq polymerase is an enzyme used to amplify the DNA
sequences in order to obtain enough replicated sample for
testing. Without Taq polymerase, the genetic testing kit
recited in the Tautz patent would be inoperable because no
PCR could occur. LifeTech’s own witness admitted that the
Taq polymerase is one of the “main” and “major”
components of the accused kits. In short, there is evidence
in the record to support the jury’s finding that a polymerase
such as Taq is a “substantial portion” of the patented
invention.95
As a practical matter, there are at least two problems with this
analysis. The first is that almost any component might be found to
be “important” to an invention that it is a part of, and the only
criteria provided by the court for determining exactly what this
term means is that “important components” include those that are
essential for the operability of an invention. For example, since the
STR assays of the Life Technologies kits could not be carried out
in the absence of the Taq polymerase, the Federal Circuit
concluded that this enzyme, by itself, constitutes a substantial
portion of the components in the assay kits.96
While the court’s finding that the Taq polymerase is essential is
certainly correct, it is also true that the assays could not have been
performed in the absence of the primers, the reaction mix, or the
buffer.97 The sole component of the kits that might be left out

94

Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted).
95
Id. at 1353, 1356 (citations omitted).
96
Id.
97
PCR amplifications require primers to hybridize to specific DNA sequences
and thereby set sites of amplification, a reaction mixture that contains reactants
needed for the amplification to proceed and a buffer to suspend components and
maintain the desired pH. PCR Amplification, PROMEGA CORP.,
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without completely destroying operability would be the DNA
control sequences, and even these cannot be unequivocally
identified as being outside the scope of § 271(f)(1) since the
Federal Circuit did not suggest that only components that are
essential to operability are “important.”98 The control sequences
would certainly be “important” in the sense that they help to ensure
the reliability of assays. Thus, the guidance provided by the court
does little to help in determining whether a particular component
might, by itself, trigger liability.
The second problem with the Federal Circuit’s construction of
“all or a substantial portion” was pointed out in the Amicus Brief
for the United States filed in support of the Supreme Court
granting certiorari in this case.99 Specifically, the Brief argues that
defining this phrase as referring to a quantitative portion of
components is actually more compatible with a textual analysis of
the statute than defining it in terms of the relative importance of
components:
The term “substantial” can have either a quantitative
meaning (“of ample or considerable amount”) or a
qualitative meaning (“important”). Section 271(f)(1)’s
context makes clear that the provision uses the term
“substantial” in its quantitative sense. Section 271(f)(1)
imposes liability for supplying “all or a substantial portion
of the components” of the invention. 35 U.S.C. 271(f)(1)
(emphases added). The term “all” necessarily carries a
quantitative meaning: when used with a plural noun, “all”
means “the whole of” or “the whole number of.” The term
“portion” likewise invokes a quantity: “a part of any
whole.” The phrase “all or a substantial portion of the
components” therefore is most naturally read to include (1)
https://www.promega.com/resources/product-guides-and-selectors/protocolsand-applications-guide/pcr-amplification/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
98
Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1356.
99
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae On Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 14, at 16–17 (citations omitted). For arguments based on a
comparison between the language used in § 271(f)(1) and § 272(f)(2), see Brief
of the United States as Amicus Curiae On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 14, at 17–19.
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all of the components of a patented invention, and (2) a
quantitatively substantial percentage of those components.
In a five-component invention like the genetic testing kit at
issue here, the single most important component might
constitute a substantial portion of the invention, but it
cannot constitute a substantial portion of the components.100
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the term “all or a
substantial portion”101 leaves the basis for its presence in the statute
unclear. As such, it is not a substantive requirement that a
manufacturer might comfortably use as a basis for concluding that
a prospective transfer will not be infringing.
B. Requirement for Active Inducement
The Federal Circuit also reviewed the district court’s finding
that the requirement in § 271(f)(1) that an infringer must “actively
induce the combination of components” means that there must be
another party, unrelated to the infringer, that is the object of the
inducement.102 Since Life Technologies just supplied Taq
polymerase to a foreign branch of the same company, the district
court concluded that no unrelated party existed and infringement
had not occurred.103
Again, the Federal Circuit reversed, stating:
To begin, we acknowledge that the word “induce” can
suggest that one is influencing or persuading “another.”
However, induce also encompasses the more broad concept
of “to bring about, to cause.” . . . The object of the
transitive verb “induce” can either be a person or a thing,
such as an activity or result. The statute is written such that
an activity— “the combination”—is the object of “induce,”
not a person. Had Congress wanted to limit “induce” to
actions completed by two separate parties, it could easily
have done so by assigning liability only where one party
100

Id. at 16–17 (citations omitted).
Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1352.
102
Id. at 1351–53; see also Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., No. 10-cv281-bbc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82708, at *15-18 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 9, 2010).
103
Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1351.
101
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actively induced another “to combine the [patented]
components.” Yet, “another” is absent from § 271(f)(1) . . .
.104
Given Congress’ choice of broadening language — which
focuses solely on the activity abroad (“the combination”)
rather than the actor performing the combination—and
acknowledgment of “the need for a legislative solution to
close a loophole” identified in Deepsouth, Legislative
History, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5828, it is unlikely that
Congress intended § 271(f)(1) to hold companies liable for
shipping components overseas to third parties, but not for
shipping those same components overseas to themselves or
their foreign subsidiaries.105
It should be noted that the court construes an activity (the
making of the combination invention) and not infringement as
being the object of inducing.106 It should also be noted that there is
no indication that inducement to make the combination requires
anything more than the sale of a component.107 These factors
suggest that United States manufacturers supplying components to
companies abroad may be liable even if they did not realize that a
composition subsequently made and sold abroad was covered by a
United States patent, even though they may have done nothing to
encourage the assembly the infringing product beyond having
supplied one or more components.
IV.
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
The decisions by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
discussed herein have given United States manufacturers a few
clear benchmarks for determining when sales to foreign buyers can
be carried out without creating a substantial risk of infringement
under section § 271(f). Under current law, manufacturers will not
infringe any claims to methods by selling components to products
overseas or by providing information on how to perform a
104

Id.
Id. at 1352–53.
106
Id. at 1351.
107
Id.
105
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method.108 Nor should there be infringement in situations in which
material sent to a buyer is not used directly as part of an invention,
but is only used to make copies that are incorporated into
inventions.109 This may be used to exclude the transfer of software
(as in Microsoft) and perhaps some types of biological inventions
from creating a risk of infringement.
Apart from transfers involving these factors, trying to reliably
ascertain whether the transfer of a component to a foreign buyer
may infringe § 271(f)(1) becomes much more complicated. One
element in the statute that might be relied on in trying to find a
basis for concluding that a sale can be safely made is the
requirement that a manufacturer must have supplied a foreign
entity with “all or a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention.”110 However, according to the Federal
Circuit in its Life Technologies decision, even a single component
may fulfill this requirement provided that it is important or
essential to the operability of the invention.111 As previously
discussed herein, this statutory construction could apply to almost
any component and will therefore be essentially useless to a
manufacturer trying to ascertain the risk associated with a sale.
A second element in § 271(f)(1) that might provide a basis for
limiting the scope of the statute is that components must be
supplied “in such manner as to actively induce the combination of
such components outside of the United States.”112 The requirement
of active inducement also appears in § 271(b), a statute that differs
from § 271(f) in that it is concerned with inducing direct
infringement in the U.S. Nevertheless, there has historically been a
tacit assumption that the requirement of active inducement is
essentially the same in both statutes.113
108

See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
109
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp, 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1757 (2007).
110
See Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1356.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1351.
113
This is important because the law surrounding 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012)
has received a great deal of clarification in decisions by the United States
Supreme Court, whereas § 271(f) has received relatively little attention.
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The elements necessary for establishing an intent to induce
infringement114 under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) were considered by the
Federal Circuit in DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.115 Part of this
case was heard en banc with the objective of resolving prior
conflicting decisions of the Federal Circuit regarding whether an
inducer need only have had an intent to induce the acts that that led
to infringement (in which case knowledge of infringement is not
required) or whether the inducer must have had an intent to
actually induce infringement itself.116 Citing Manville Sales Corp.
v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,117 the DSU Medical Corp. court stated:
The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged
infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew
or should have known his actions would induce actual
infringements. The requirement that the alleged infringer
knew or should have known his actions would induce
actual infringement necessarily includes the requirement
that he or she knew of the patent.118
Later, the court further elaborated on the requirements for
active inducement:
To establish liability under section 271(b), a patent holder
must prove that once the defendants knew of the patent,
they “actively and knowingly aid[ed] and abett[ed]
another’s direct infringement.” However, “knowledge of
the acts alleged to constitute infringement” is not enough.
The “mere knowledge of possible infringement by others

Specifically, there have been four recent Supreme Court decisions addressing
the meaning of inducement under § 271(b), but only in Microsoft was
inducement under § 271(f) considered.
114
Although 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) does not specify that intent is required
to induce infringement, it has long been held to be a requirement. See Timothy
R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 408 (2005).
115
See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (2006).
116
See Holbrook, supra note 8, at 1008.
117
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys. Corp., 917 F.2d 544, 554 (Fed.
Cir. 1990).
118
DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1304 (citations omitted).
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does not amount to inducement; specific intent and action
to induce infringement must be proven.”119
Thus, it appears settled that infringement under § 271(b) is
restricted to those instances in which there was bad intent
involved. However, there is an important distinction between
§ 271(b) and § 271(f). The former statute states that “[w]hoever
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer[,]”120 whereas the latter is concerned with actively
inducing “the combination of such components outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe.”121 Just on its face, it
would appear that § 271(f)’s language is much more in keeping
with the view that all that is needed for a manufacturer to be liable
is for it to have induced the actions on the part of a foreign
purchaser.
This view is also consistent with the way that the Federal
Circuit discussed inducement in its recent Life Technologies
decision.
We first address whether “to actively induce the
combination” requires involvement of a third party or
merely the specific intent to cause the combination of the
components of a patented invention outside the United
States . . . .
The object of the transitive verb “induce” can either be a
person or a thing, such as an activity or result. The statute
is written such that an activity — “the combination” — is
the object of “induce,” not a person”122
Neither this decision by the Federal Circuit nor the Microsoft
decision by the United States Supreme Court ever mentions intent
to induce infringement (as opposed to intent to induce the
combination of an infringing composition) as a factor in
determining liability. In Microsoft, the Court states:
119

Id. at 1305.
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
121
Id. § 271(f)(1) (emphasis added).
122
See Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (citations omitted). Note the absence of any suggestion of intent to induce
infringement.
120
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Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “from
the United States . . . in such manner as to actively induce
the combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1)
(emphasis added). Under this formulation, the very
components supplied from the United States, and not
copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined
abroad to form the patented invention at issue.123
If inducement under § 271(f) only means inducing the making
of a combination, a manufacturer in the United States sending a
component overseas that is then used in as part of composition will
rarely know the degree to which these actions may be creating a
potential for infringement under § 271(f) and, short of abandoning
sales from the United States, will generally be able to do nothing to
avoid liability.124 It also means that if the manufacturer is aware of
a potentially problematic patent, it cannot use a good faith belief
that the foreign composition was noninfringing as a means of
exoneration. As far as can be told from case law, merely selling the
component may be all that is needed to fulfill the § 271(f)(1)
requirement for active inducement.
V.
CONCLUSION
As previously noted, the Supreme Court is currently reviewing
the Federal Circuit’s holding that the sale of a single commodity
component of a multi-component invention may be an infringing
act under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).125 A reversal of the Federal Circuit
would provide manufacturers with an additional benchmark that
they can use in concluding that some sales can be made to foreign
buyers without incurring substantial risks of infringement.
However, a great deal of uncertainty will remain in instances
where it is unclear whether a component being sold actually
qualifies as a commodity or where the manufacturer needs to sell
more than a single component.
123

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S.Ct. 1746, 1757 (2007) (emphasis
added).
124
Reasons for this include the possibility of there being unidentified United
States patents relevant to products made abroad and a lack of control concerning
what foreign purchasers do.
125
See Life Techs., 773 F.3d at 1341.
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What is needed is for Congress to repeal § 271(f) entirely. To
the extent that the statute had any merit at the beginning (and it is
not clear that it did), it has none today. Two of the justifications for
passing the bill were that it would improve the United States trade
deficit and protect United States jobs. In fact, the bill does the
opposite. It puts United States manufacturers in a position where
they must consider how goods that they sell overseas will be used.
If the goods are combined in a way that would infringe a United
States patent on a device or composition, there is a possibility that
the manufacturer will be facing a lawsuit and exposure to
substantial damages. This is true even though infringement only
occurs in a theoretical sense (composition claims in United States
patents do not normally cover products made and sold outside of
the US) and even though the United States manufacturer cannot
control, and has not directly benefited from, the sale of the foreign
products. Thus, legislation that was supposed to promote the
export of United States goods and protect United States jobs has,
ironically, created a problem for manufacturers that can most
easily be solved by these manufacturers either abandoning foreign
sales entirely or moving the production of goods outside of the US.
One underlying motivation that drove the passage of the
statute, that patent holders were being cheated of rights due to a
loophole in the law, does not seem to have a clear factual basis.
The statute imposes liability when no product has been made, used,
or sold in the United States that would affect a patent owner’s
profits, and the ability of the patent owner to enforce its rights
against a foreign company that attempts to sell an infringing
product in the United States has not been compromised. If the
United States patent owner also has patents in foreign countries,
then these can still be enforced. If the patent owner has not pursued
patent protection in those countries or has been unable to secure
such rights, then what is there to justify holding a United States
manufacturer, a party that did not even make the sales, liable?
Perhaps at the time that the legislation establishing § 271(f)
was enacted, the thought was that, if a foreign company could not
buy components made in the U.S., it would not be able to make
products containing those components and foreigners would have
no choice but to buy higher value United States goods. There does
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not appear to be anything in the congressional record that actually
supports such a view, but even if it was true in 1984, it certainly is
not today. A foreign company that cannot buy a component made
in the United States will simply buy it elsewhere. The only things
affected will be the sale of components by United States
companies and the jobs derived from those sales.

